planned parenthood v casey opinion

in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or The Casey decision explicitly invalidated as an undue burden a requirement for a married woman to notify her husband before obtaining an abortion. "(c) Medical emergency.--The requirements of subsection (a) shall not apply in case of a medical emergency. "285. Stat. § 3207(b) (1990). JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S effort to preserve as much of Roe as possible leads him to read the joint opinion as more "constan[t]" and "steadfast" than can be believed.

Respondents' argument itself gives implicit recognition to this principle, at one of its critical points. A. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. a delay of much more than a day because the waiting period requires that a woman seeking an abortion make at least two visits to the doctor. The joint opinion also points to the reliance interests involved in this context in its effort to explain why precedent must be followed for precedent's sake.

The collection of information with respect to actual patients. ", "(a) General rule.--Except in the case of a medical emergency or except as provided in this section, if a pregnant woman is less than 18 years of age and not emancipated, or if she has been adjudged an incompetent under 20 Pa. C. S. § 5511 (relating to petition and hearing; examination by court-appointed physician), a physician shall not perform an abortion upon her unless, in the case of a woman who is less than 18 years of age, he first obtains the informed consent both of the pregnant woman and of one of her parents; or, in the case of a woman who is incompetent, he first obtains the informed consent of her guardian. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom it is irrelevant. See id., at 760-764. been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives. Regardless of whether exceptions are made for particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability. Of course, as we have said, § 3209's real target is narrower even than the class of women seeking abortions identified by the State: it is married women seeking abortions who do not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions and who do not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions to the notice requirement. Obviously, I do not share THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S views of homosexuality as sexual deviance. Except in a medical emergency, the statute requires that at least 24 hours before performing an abortion a physician inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the "probable gestational age of the unborn child." 91-902, affirmed; No. They began with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), holding that legislatively mandated racial segregation in public transportation works no denial of equal protection, rejecting the argument that racial separation enforced by the legal machinery of American society treats the black race as inferior. . A physician who performs an abortion on. We adhere to this principle for two reasons. In 1988 and 1989 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, led by Governor Robert Casey, enacted These considerations begin our analysis of the woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it, for this reason: though the abortion decision may originate within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise. ensure that a woman's decision to abort is a well considered one, and By finding and relying upon the right facts, he can invalidate, it would seem, almost any abortion restriction that strikes him as "undue"-subject, of course, to the possibility of being reversed by a court of appeals or Supreme Court that is as unconstrained in reviewing his decision as he was in making it.

Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S., at 520 (opinion of KENNEDY, J. With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it. . . According to the AMA, "[r]esearchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year. The emptiness of the "reasoned judgment" that produced Roe is displayed in plain view by the fact that, after more than 19 years of effort by some of the brightest (and most determined) legal minds in the country, after more than 10 cases upholding abortion rights in this Court, and after dozens upon dozens of amicus briefs submitted in these and other cases, the best the Court can do to explain how it is that the word "liberty" must be thought to include the right to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice. count their views, as though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining some kind of social consensus. The State may promote its preferences by funding childbirth, by creating and maintaining alternatives to abortion, and by espousing the virtues of family; but it must respect. Moreover, the statute requires physicians to inform all of their patients of "[t]he probable gestational age of the unborn child."

Moreover, as discussed above, the state interest in potential human life is not an interest in loco parentis, for the fetus is not a person. health of the mother" is also reaffirmed. On this record, it can scarcely be said that any deeply rooted tradition of relatively unrestricted abortion in our his-. Clearly what the four have in common is to make getting an abortion more onerous. That brings us, of course, to the point where much criticism has been directed at Roe, a criticism that always inheres when the Court draws a specific rule from what in the Constitution is but a general standard. "298. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 878-882 (1990), but that principle does not establish the quite different (and quite dangerous) proposition that a law which directly regulates a fundamental right will not be found to violate the Constitution unless it imposes an "undue burden." "(2) The county and state in which the woman resides. Again, my answer remains the same as in Webster: "[I]f this were a true and genuine concern, we would have to abandon vast areas of our constitutional jurisprudence . In keeping with our rejection of the common-law understanding of a woman's role within the family, the Court held in Danforth that the Constitution does not permit a State to require a married woman to obtain her husband's consent before undergoing an abortion. Eisenstadt, 405 U. S., at 453. Most significantly, the joint opinion's conclusion that the spousal notice requirement of the Act, see § 3209, imposes an "undue burden" is based in large measure on the District Court's "detailed findings of fact," which the joint opinion sets out at great length, ante, at 888-891. public health knowledge through the compilation of relevant data, and to promote the Commonwealth's interest in protection of the unborn child, a report of each abortion performed shall be made to the department on forms prescribed by it. the event that contraception should fail.

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